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Abstract 
This paper attempts to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for the Yen/Dollar 
exchange rate. To that end, we apply a sequential procedure that considers both the 
dynamics of exchange rates and central bank interventions to data covering the period 
from 1971 to 2003. Our results suggest that implicit bands existed in two subperiods: 
April-December 1980 and March-October 1987, the latter coinciding with the Louvre 
Accord. Furthermore, the study of the credibility of such implicit bands indicates the 
high degree of confidence attributed by economic agents to the evolution of the 
Yen/Dollar exchange rate within the detected implicit band rate, thus lending further 
support to the relevance of such implicit bands. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 The de facto exchange rate policy adopted by monetary authorities has tended to 
differ from the announced de jure exchange rate regime, which is why IMF 
classifications are not always a good guide to the true exchange rate intentions of said 
authorities. 
 
 The literature in this area seeks to achieve two linked objectives, namely, to 
detect divergences between de jure and de facto regimes and to assess the consequences 
of these differences on the relevance of exchange rates for macroeconomic 
performance1. Recognition of the divergences opens up a number of key questions 
regarding the analysis and recommendations of international economic organizations as 
well as for academic work: which is the correct classification and which variables and 
methods should be considered for this purpose? 
 
 Recently, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) have presented a comprehensive 
classification of the exchange rate regimes of 153 countries over the last half-century. 
Their research suggests the importance of de facto bands in the international economy. 
Other approaches focus on the variation of central bank reserves and acknowledge the 
relevance of intervention in detecting implicit pegs and bands (see, for instance, 
Poirson, 2001). 
 
The main objective of this paper is to use a sequential procedure that considers 
both the dynamics of exchange rates and central bank interventions to detect implicit 
bands for the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. 
 
 We analyse the Yen/Dollar exchange rate as a interesting case study since it has 
traditionally been considered a paradigmatic example of a flexible exchange rate (see 
e.g. Cooper, 1999). Notwithstanding the customary consideration of the Yen/Dollar 
exchange rate as free-floating, a number of studies2 have examined the behaviour of the 
US Federal Reserve and the Japanese monetary authorities in exchange rate markets and 
the effectiveness of such intervention in driving the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. 
 
 This paper is organized as follows. To place the study in its proper context, 
Section 2 presents a brief history of exchange rate regimes. In Section 3 we propose a 
test to detect implicit band and to assess the statistical significance of the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) approach. In addition, we apply two tests to interventions and to 
exchange rate data to assess both the intention and the efficacy of foreign exchange 
market interventions. Section 4 examines the credibility of the implicit bands found in 
Section 3. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. 
  
 
                                                 
1 See Coudert and Dubert (2004) for a survey of studies on implicit exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) examine the relevance of the exchange rate regime classifications for empirical 
macroeconomics.  
2 For example, Ito and Yabu (2004) and Frenkel et al. (2004) estimate the Japanese monetary authorities’ 
reaction function. 
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2. Exchange rate regimes 
 
The relationship between a country’s exchange rate regime and its 
macroeconomic performance has been discussed extensively ever since the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system. After the prolonged period of fixed exchange rates which 
characterized the system, many anticipated a generalisation of more flexible regimes in 
the belief that these were better equipped to protect the economy from real and 
monetary shocks. Instead, however, in several countries the monetary authorities 
pegged the external value of their currencies to the Dollar, the Yen, the Pound Sterling, 
or to a basket of currencies, believing that greater exchange rate flexibility led to 
excessive fluctuations. Such volatility was considered to give rise to economic 
instability, having a negative impact on productive investment, international trade and 
growth.   
 
 During the 1980s, monetary authorities adopted their exchange rate regimes with 
the clear intention of seeking a sound stabilisation instrument to protect against real and 
monetary shocks. In particular, they expected that fixing the exchange rate would 
prevent excessive monetary growth, thus conferring greater discipline on public 
spending (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001). The widespread monetary instability 
experienced during the period called for disinflation and budget consolidation policies 
and it was no surprise that monetary considerations attracted more attention. 
 
The series of crises in the 1990s led to many to once again question the 
appropriateness of pegged exchange rates. More flexible systems were now considered 
more adequate than their fixed counterparts as a means of protection against speculative 
pressures. This change in perspective stemmed from the growing importance of 
movements of private capital between countries, a circumstance which had a profound 
impact on the international financial system. The crises experienced during these years 
centred on the evolution of the capital account, in contrast to the previous decades, 
when more traditional causes –high fiscal deficits and the ensuing monetisation, 
distortions in goods and services markets, as well as production market factors, among 
others- were paramount (Summers, 2000). 
 
In this context, this paper aims to study the exchange rate regimes followed by 
the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. The monetary and trade relationships between Japan and 
US have been difficult in different periods of their recent history. The monetary policy 
pursued by the Federal Reserve seems to have been quite independent while the 
Japanese monetary policy appears instead to have been conditioned by the appreciating 
trend of the Yen with respect to the Dollar (Glick and Hutchinson, 1994). This trend 
may explain the differences, at least since 1971, between Japan and the US in trade 
policy and the financial pressures due to the accumulation of external surpluses. The 
observed appreciation of the Yen and the expectations of further appreciations might be 
reasons for the deflationary monetary policy of Japan at the end of the seventies. 
 
Before the fall of Bretton-Woods, the sharp appreciation of the Yen implied 
better competitiveness for US industrial goods. As a response, the Bank of Japan 
reduced the short-term interest rates in order to switch this trend. The Japanese economy 
entered in an unstable period due to the depreciation, and expectations of further 
depreciation, of the Yen and the increasing risk derived from the accumulation of assets 
denominated in dollars by the Japanese financial institutions. 
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In the 1990s the Japanese economy seemed to be in a liquidity trap externally 
imposed. Economists and practitioners alike were unable to identify the true origins of 
the crisis in which consumption and investment were weakened; in fact, this lack of 
knowledge is one of the most important failures of modern macroeconomics 
(McKinnon, 2000). In this period, Japan suffered high rates of unemployment and 
deflation, as well as low growth. In fact, the 1990s has been considered “a lost decade” 
by Hiyashi and Prescott (2002).     
 
The choice of the exchange rate regime which every country has to make has 
also centred empirical discussion on the appropriate estimation of the economic costs 
and benefits of different systems. A difficulty that often arises concerns the wide range 
of possibilities since there are more than two or three regimes (in contrast to the 
approach taken in the numerous studies which naturally employed the official IMF 
classification). Rather, countries use a range of exchange rate systems, such as currency 
boards, narrow bands, moving or crawling bands, and managed floats. 
 
To all these should be added another difficulty which has come to light more 
recently: many countries do not declare the true system used. The exchange rate policy 
followed de facto by numerous countries has been found to be vastly different to what 
was officially notified to the IMF by the economic authorities. Many countries 
experience what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have called the “fear of floating”, namely, 
they do not really allow their exchange rates to move freely, regardless of the de jure 
exchange rate system reported by the authorities to the IMF. 
 
One of the consequences of this divergence between “deeds” and “words” 
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzeneger, 2000; 2001) has been to call into question the results of 
many empirical studies based on the IMF classification. For this reason, before 
proceeding any further with an evaluation of the different exchange rate regimes, a 
classification of the de facto systems is needed to replace the de jure systems used until 
recently by researchers in the field of International Economics.  
 
One of the aims of this paper is to identify implicit band or peg regimes. 
Specifically, we examine the possible existence of fluctuation bands, “agreed” by the 
monetary authorities in order to intervene in the Yen/Dollar market during the period 
1971-2003. In this regard, Fischer (2001), for example, has pointed to the possibility 
that a commitment to maintain a desired exchange rate target zone between the US 
Dollar, the Euro (the Deutsche Mark previously) and the Yen may have existed, albeit 
informally and loosely. 
 
According to the literature on optimum currency area, the most appropriate 
regime may vary in each circumstance, attending to the nature of disequilibria suffered 
by an economy, the capacity to transmit or isolate from internal or external shocks, and 
the ability of economic authorities to use different instruments of economic policy (see, 
for instance, Horvath, 2003). The observed exchange rate system might be related to 
concrete episodes and the economic policy used as a response. This literature may 
provide a good guide to interpret the de facto deviations from the de jure exchange rate 
regime. In this sense, flexible exchange rates could be preferable when real shocks, both 
domestic and external, occur while fixed regimes seems to perform better when shocks 
are merely nominal (Buiter, 1995). A smaller degree of trade openness reduces the 
possible damage done to internal price stability and to the external balance of a country 
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due to exchange rate variability (McKinnon, 1963). Also a small product diversification 
increases the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and so the need for exchange rate 
flexibility (Kenen, 1969), and it is more difficult to fix the exchange rate if the inflation 
rates of the two countries are quite dissimilar and prices and wages are sticky (Fleming, 
1971). Lastly, pegging the exchange rate can provide a reasonably credible commitment 
to a non-inflationary policy but, as indicated by Stockman (1999), there are alternative 
institutional arrangements that have shown a better performance.  
 
 
3. Implicit bands 
 
3.1. Detection of implicit bands 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) proposed a “natural” classification of exchange rate 
regimes, as opposed to the “artificial” one followed by the IMF. In their extensive research 
they collected monthly data on the exchange rates of 153 countries from 1946 to 2001, 
highlighting the existence of dual, multiple, or even parallel (legally or otherwise) rates. In 
the event of the absence of a dual market to adequately classify the de facto regimes, their 
approach based the search for peg or band regimes on the proportional variation of the 
absolute value of the exchange rate, as well as on the probability that it would remain 
within a given fluctuation band (±1%, ±2% or ±5%) over a rolling 2 or 5-year period. 
Reinhart and Rogoff, somewhat surprisingly, focus on the evolution of exchange rates, 
without taking into account variations in official foreign currency reserves. 
 
One of the weaknesses of the approach taken by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is 
that the results are not filtered by their statistical significance. For this reason we 
perform a variant approach to detect implicit pegs or bands that involves direct testing 
to see whether the average of the proportional absolute monthly variations for each 
rolling 24-month period is significantly less than ±1% or ±2%. To test if the population 
mean (of the monthly variations during 24-month periods) is less than or equal to a 
given mean 0  (±1% or ±2%) the following expression may be used:  
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The acceptance region of the null hypothesis is x , where x is the sample 
mean of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate and 
n
t n

  1,1  , where 1,1  nt   is the 
critical value of the t-Student distribution at a confidence level of 1 ,   is the serial 
population deviation and n  is the sample size. At a 5% confidence level we choose a 
critical value of 1.71. 
 
The results of the application of this statistical procedure are given in Figures 1 
and 2. 
 
[Figure 1, here] 
 
Figure 1 show the results when ±1% fluctuation bands are considered. The 
average value (24 months rolling) of absolute proportional variations of the exchange 
rate of each month with respect to the previous month is given in blue, while the critical 
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region appears in red. Thus, when the red series is above the blue one the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, which would suggest the presence of fluctuation bands. 
This occurs around the Bretton Woods period but extends until the end of 1977. With 
respect to the first years of the 1970s, any observer could argue that the Japanese 
economy was suffering a real shock due to the increase of the crude oil prices, and 
therefore the convenience of a flexible exchange rate.  However the oil shock only had a 
temporary impact due to the rapid response of the Bank of Japan (Meltzer, 1986), quite 
different from the more permanent character of the monetary shock produced at the end 
of the Bretton Woods system (Hetzel, 2004); in this sense its temporary character would 
have made more appropriate a de facto regime. Furthermore, the small size of the 
Japanese economy compared to the US, its lesser diversification of production, and its 
continuous external surplus could explain why the Japanese monetary authorities 
optimally chose less flexibility for their exchange rate, as suggested by Aghion et al. 
(1999) and Bachetta (2000).  
 
Likewise, between 1983 and 1985, between 1995 and 1997, and at the end of the 
sample period the results indicate that the regime was in the neighbourhood of the ±1% 
fluctuation band. In particular, during 2003 the Japanese economy was in a deep 
deflationary process, aggravated by a zero interest rate policy (Ito and Mishkin, 2004); 
and, in this context, Svensson (2003) pointed out that the Bank of Japan made a 
commitment of maintaining a level of the exchange rate compatible with the objective 
of affecting agent expectations. This non-conventional monetary policy and the fact that 
the deflation had its origin in a domestic monetary shock (Metzler, 2002) could explain 
the smaller de facto flexibility of the exchange rate in 2003. 
 
[Figure 2, here] 
  
As can be seen in Figure 2, the average of the monthly variations generally lies 
below the critical region when a ±2% fluctuation band is used, suggesting (given the 
rolling quality of the 24-month test) that in practical terms there were monthly limits of 
±2% during the entire period. Combining this result with that observed with the ±1% 
band, we can be confident that fluctuation bands between ±1% and ±2% existed 
throughout the sample period, except during the three subperiods detected with the ±1% 
test, when the bands were narrower. 
 
3.2. Sensitivity analysis3  
Results from the previous analysis seem reasonable, but monetary authorities could 
have used an alternative benchmark to define the implicit bands as the deviation from 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). 
 
In its absolute version, PPP theory establishes a relationship between the exchange 
rate (St, expressed as the home currency price of a unit of foreign exchange) and the 
ratio of domestic and foreign prices (Pt and Pt
* respectively), so that 
 
*/t t tS P P  
                                                 
3 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this sensitivity analysis using deviations from 
purchasing power parity. 
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As can be seen, the higher the domestic price level relative to the foreign price level, the 
higher must be the exchange rate in order to retain purchasing power parity between 
domestic and foreign currencies. 
 
The absolute PPP is a too restrictive hypothesis for at least two reasons. First, 
factors such as costs of gathering and processing information, transport costs and other 
obstacles to trade (in particular tariffs and quotas), and market imperfections can limit 
spatial arbitrage and therefore account for deviations from absolute PPP. Second, the 
weights used in the computation of a price level could differ across countries and as a 
consequence the absolute PPP may be hardly held. 
 
For these reasons, a less restrictive relationship between prices and exchange rate 
is considered. This is the relative PPP, which asserts that the percentage rate of change 
of the exchange rate will equal the differential between the percentage rates for change 
of price levels at home and abroad. That is 
 
*
t t ts p p     
where denotes first difference and lower-case letters denotes logs. Therefore, if the 
domestic inflation rate exceeds the foreign inflation rate, a domestic currency 
depreciation (i.e, an increase in  st) is required to sustain purchasing power parity 
between domestic and foreign currencies. Similarly, if the foreign inflation rate exceeds 
the domestic inflation rate, this will be associated with a domestic currency appreciation 
(i.e., a reduction in  st).  
 
Relative PPP is less strict than absolute PPP in allowing domestic and foreign 
prices (expressed in domestic currency) to differ from each other but still sustains the 
assumption that these deviations will not grow or diminish persistently over time. The 
relative purchasing power of domestic money vis-à-vis foreign money will therefore be 
fixed over time, with exchange rate changes  st assuring such parity.  The relative 
version of PPP has a further advantage over absolute PPP in that as long as the weights 
used to define the domestic and foreign price indices remain constant over time, then 
the two weighting schemes do not need to be the same. 
 
We compute an alternative indicator to detect implicit pegs or bands using 
deviations of observed changes in exchange rates from inflation differential between 
Japan and USA. Again we test whether the average of the proportional absolute 
monthly variations of the real exchange rate for each rolling 24-month period is 
significantly less than ±1% or ±2%4. Note that this time the sample covers until 
December 2007, in an attempt to detect any other episode of implicit band in the post-
                                                 
4 We also explore the possibility of much wider implicit bands, but they were not consistent with the data. 
As a matter of fact, although the maximum deviation of the observed exchange rate variation from the 
theoretical exchange rate variation derived from relative PPP (i. e., the inflation differential between 
Japan and USA) was 10.27% during the January 1971-December 2007 period, the average deviation was 
2.12% and the median 1.68%, giving further support to the hypothesis of implicit fluctuation bands of 
±2%. 
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Plaza Accord period5. Figures 5 and 6 show the results for ±1% and ±2% fluctuation 
bands, respectively.  
 
[Figures 3 and 4, here] 
 
 As can be seen, we obtain similar results than in Figures 1 and 2, therefore 
providing further support to the fluctuation bands we have previously detected.  
 
3.3. Incorporating interventions 
 In this section we incorporate foreign exchange intervention by monetary 
authorities into the search for bands in the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. In the previous 
section, de facto bands or pegs were identified for most of the sample period using an 
approach based on exchange rate data. This suggests that the results obtained are not 
informative. Most of the literature that classifies exchange rate regimes also uses 
exchange rate data or a combination of foreign reserve and exchange rate data. Such 
analysis either has either not taken central bank interventions into account or has used 
an imperfect proxy for them so as to detect periods with exchange rate regimes other 
than a free floating one6. An ideal method should, however, consider foreign exchange 
market interventions to screen both for the intentions of central banks and their efficacy 
with regard to peg or band regimes7. 
 
 In spite of its relevance, the availability of intervention data limits its 
consideration. Here we use Federal Reserve intervention data from 1 January 1980 until 
31 December 2003 as well as data from the Japanese Ministry of Finance from 13 May 
1991 until 31 March 2001. We consider the intervention to have a positive sign when 
the monetary authority buys US dollars and a negative one for other actions. 
 
 The Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) test is used as a directional prediction test. 
In this test, the sign of central bank intervention and the exchange rate trend are related, 
particularly when lagged interventions (to measure efficacy) and leads (to detect the 
monetary authorities’ intention to maintain bands or pegs) are considered relative to the 
exchange rate trend. In the first case, one would expect the ex ante intervention 
consisting of the sale of US Dollars to be followed by an appreciation of the Yen. In the 
second case, the ex post intervention is considered once the trend has been observed, 
                                                 
5 Jeon and Lee (2002) show that within-country market efficiency appears to have become stronger in the 
post-Plaza agreement period than before and have not been affected by the major foreign exchange policy 
co-ordinations.  
6 Neely (2000) has shown that central bank interventions and reserve changes may be loosely related. 
Therefore, the use of reserves instead of interventions may lead to inadequate classifications. 
7 We study the incidence of interventions at the exchange rate level. See Domínguez (1993, 2003) for a 
survey of the literature analyzing the effect of intervention on the volatility of exchange rates. Wan and 
Kao (2008) find that foreign exchange interventions by the Japanese authorities were effective not only in 
altering the exchange rate level, but also in volatility reduction. On the other hand, results in Chen and 
Huang (2007) suggest no significant difference between the effectiveness of joint intervention and 
independent intervention on the yen/US dollar exchange rate during the 15 August 1996-6 January 1999 
period. Finally, Ramchander and Sant (2002) show that Fed intervention is associated with negative 
changes in the US$/ volatility during the 1985 to 1993 period as a whole, and specifically during the 1 
January, 1985 to 21 February, 1987 Plaza period and the 21 February, 1987 to 31 December, 1989 Louvre 
period.   
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assuming that the intervention can be characterized as leaning against the wind: a 
depreciation of the Yen should normally be followed by the sale of Dollars8. 
 
 The test is applied to daily exchange rate and intervention data and calculated for 
monthly periods (i. e., the frequencies needed to construct the statistic are obtained for 
each month of the sample period)9. The sign of the exchange rate trend is measured by 
the difference between the current value st and the previous value st-k, where 
k=1,5,10,20,30,40,60. 
 
The Pesaran and Timmermann (DA, 1992) test is a directional prediction test of 
changes under the null hypothesis that the actual and predicted values are independent.  
 
The distribution of the DA statistic is N(0,1), which has the following structure:  
      SRISRSRISRDA   5.0varvar , where  

 
H
h
hhh yyIHSR
1
1 0ˆ.  and 
  1111 ˆ11ˆ ppppSRI  ,  SRI being the success ratio in the case of independence 
between actual and predicted values under the null hypothesis. The other elements 
are:  

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0 ,  

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0ˆˆ ,     SRISRIHSR 
 1var 1  and  
             1111112111212 ˆ11ˆ4ˆ1ˆ1211ˆ2var ppppppppppHHSRI   .  
 
In the case of ex post interventions, the actual values are the exchange rate trends 
and the predicted values are the signs of the interventions. The contrary is true when ex 
ante interventions are considered. The description of this application is presented in 
Table 1. 
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
For the analysis of the intention of the monetary authorities (ex-ante 
interventions) the description of each variable and function of the test is presented in the 
second and third columns. The analysis of the efficacy is explained in the forth and the 
fifth columns. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
The results for exchange-rate interventions by the Federal Reserve (FED) are 
reported in Table 2.  Panel A suggests that the FED showed willingness to maintain the 
exchange rate only in specific subperiods. In particular, the Pesaran-Timmermann test 
indicates the years 1980 (coinciding with explicit commitments by the US and Japanese 
economic authorities) and 1987 (when the Louvre Accord was signed to stabilize 
                                                 
8 We adopt this approach because standard time-series techniques may not be appropriate when dealing 
with the study of foreign market intervention and the associated behaviour of exchange rates. Exchange 
rates are highly volatile and interventions are usually sporadic (Fatum and Hutchison, 2003, 2005). In 
contrast, Frenkel et al. (2004) estimate a reaction function for sterilised interventions by the Japanese 
monetary authorities and find major interventions after 1995 in reaction to the previous exchange rate 
trend. 
9 To calculate these frequencies we only consider the number of days in a given month in which the 
monetary authority intervened. 
 10 
exchange rates) for most of the values of k. In the rest of the sample period the null 
hypothesis of independence is not rejected. 
 
These conclusions can be confirmed in Panel B, where the efficacy of the 
interventions is analysed. For several months in 1980, as well as in August of 1987, 
interventions seemed to have been effective10 11. 
 
Therefore, our results suggest signs of the presence of a target zone in 1980 and 
1987. The later year coincides with the time of the Louvre Accord among the leading 
industrial nations. There are several papers analysing the Louvre Accord as a target-
zone experiment due to its commitment towards the coordination of macroeconomic 
policies in order to stabilize the exchange rates [see, e. g., Ito (1999) and Nakamura 
(1995)]. However, the presence of bands for the Yen/Dollar exchange rate in 1980 is an 
episode which has not previously been identified as a period where an implicit band 
regime was operating. Therefore a background account of such episode is necessary. In 
this sense, it should be remembered that, in 1979, as inflationary pressures at the 
wholesale level built up drastically and the current account was pushed deep into deficit, 
the Yen caved heavily on offer and depreciated sharply in the exchange market. In 
1980, the year just after the tripling of oil prices, inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator remained at only 5 percent. This suggest that homemade inflation was avoided, 
confirming that the Bank of Japan (BOJ) had both the ability and the intention to 
maintain price stability. In this sense, there were a series of coordinated changes in 
interest rates in the U. S. and Japan that did not leave the Yen/Dollar exchange rate 
unaltered (Bomhoff, 1987). Trust in the BOJ was preserved, keeping expected inflation 
at a very low level and the actual inflation not deviating from expectations by any 
significant amount (Suzuki, 1987 and 1989) 12. In addition, as documented in Cargill et 
al. (1997), the BOJ reacted very quickly selling Dollars in support of the Yen, sharply 
dropping its international reserves. This appreciation helped the Bank of Japan to 
moderate inflation. Following the adoption of more restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies to stabilize the Yen in March, the main central banks announced a closed 
cooperation to prevent the Yen from declining excessively. By mid-April, with interest 
rates falling in the United States, the Yen began to recover along with other major 
currencies [see, e. g., OECD (1980, 1981) and Pardee (1980, 1981)]. In May, the BOJ 
intervened to counter disorderly conditions. The support of a firm inflationary effort 
from the new government after parliamentary elections in June reinforced the bank’s 
credibility. Market participants become aware that Japan was achieving a rapid 
                                                 
10 In order to assess the robustness of results, we additionally apply the Fisher’s Exact Test. This test of 
independence (for 2x2 tables) is used when the members of two independent groups can fall into one of 
two mutually-exclusive categories. In our case, each day in a given month can fall into one of two 
categorical variables: the sign of the exchange rate trend and the sign of the intervention. The former may 
give two levels (appreciation or depreciation of the Yen) while the latter indicates the purchase or sale of 
Dollars. The results confirm those obtained from the Pesaran-Timmermann test. Again, the results for 
Japanese interventions are less informative and the independence hypothesis could not be rejected for the 
whole sample period. 
11 Based on an event study methodology, Fatum and Hutchison (2005) analyse the Yen/Dollar exchange 
rate and find evidence that intervention affects the rate in the short term. Taylor (2004) also obtains 
evidence supporting the view that interventions increase the probability of stability (only when the 
exchange rate is misaligned) in a Markov-switching model. 
12 It should be noted that, despite the aggressive actions taken by the BOJ to contain inflation and the 
importance of imported crude oil to Japan, the effect of the oil price on output appears to be moderate 
(Hetzle, 1999), with Japan being the only major industrial country to avoid recession (Cargill et al., 
1997). 
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adjustment to higher world oil prices, the Yen being remarkably resilient in the face of 
the prospective fall in oil production resulting of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. The 
BOJ intervened once more in September to moderate the rise of the Yen. After a series 
of financial measures, and given the strength of exports and investment demand, 
exchange rate sentiment became more favourable for the yen.  
 
Regarding the directions of interventions during 1980, Schwartz (2000) suggests 
that the Fed acquired yens in the market from February to March 1980, and from late 
March it sold yen. By the end of July, the US monetary authorities were ageing 
accumulating yens. From September 1980 to February 1981, the aim of the Fed was to 
cushion the rise of dollar, acquiring yens to pay off swap debts. This behaviour is 
consistent with the detailed account provided in Pardee (1980, 1981):  
i) in February the BOJ intervened to moderate the decline of the yen, 
supplementing its intervention in Tokyo with operations in New York through the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
ii) in March there was a joint initiative by the BOJ, the FED, the Bundesbank 
and the Swiss National Bank to support the yen in the exchanges, indicating the FED its 
willingness to purchase yen in the New York market for its own account and to provide 
resources to the BOJ if needed. The sales of dollars by the Bank of Japan were reflected 
in the US$2.2 billion decline of foreign reserves during February-March. Meanwhile, 
the Fed bought US$216.8 million equivalent of yen in the New York market in 
coordinated operations with the BOJ. 
iii) in April the Bank of Japan continued to intervene forcefully to defend the 
yen, buying back about half of the amount of dollars it sold earlier.  
iv) in July, reserves increased by US$2.0 billion. 
v) in late September-early October, the BOJ intervened in the foreign exchange 
market, due to a substantial improvement in Japan's current account position and to 
heavy demands for yen-denominated assets, producing the rise of the yen. This 
operation contributed to a US$2.2 billion increase in foreign reserves. 
vi) from early November the Yen/Dollar rate started to fluctuate around 212, 
finally dropping to 216.75. The interventions by the Fed and by the Bank of Japan 
suggest the presence of a crawling band.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that, although Japan is by far the largest participant 
government in the foreign exchange market (see Fatum and Hutchison, 2005), the 
analysis of Japanese interventions was restricted by the availability of data (from March 
1991 only). Though quite weak in April and August 1992, which might signal a lack of 
independence, in general the results do not seem to reject the hypothesis of 
independence13. With respect to the results obtained for 1987 and in relation to the FED, 
from 1987 up to 1992, Japanese monetary policy appears to have been conditioned by 
the Louvre Accord. In this sense, it is interesting to recall that large-scale, coordinated 
interventions, as those implied by the Louvre Accord, seem to have been very 
successful, as documented in Fatum and Hutchinson (2005) and Huang and Neum 
(2006). Indeed, the BOJ recognized the relevance of the stabilisation of the exchange 
rate, as its monetary policy was based in the reduction of short-run interest rates as a 
                                                 
13 Schwartz (2000) argues that the strong Yen did not weaken as a result of interventions and sterilisation 
of Dollar purchasing. However, Pinto de Andrade and Divino (2005) attribute a major role to exchange 
rates in accounting for cyclical patterns of the interest rate. In this sense, the Bank of Japan appears to 
have attempted to stabilize the exchange rate via interest rates. 
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response to the growing external surplus and the subsequent appreciation of the Yen. 
This policy accelerated the increase of the asset prices until the collapse of the bubble. 
In fact, Hetzel (2004) pointed out that the initial shock had a monetary character. In 
addition, Leigh (2004) detected several negative monetary shocks in that period, 
something that could have been justified by the desire of the Japanese monetary 
authorities for a de facto smaller flexibility of the exchange rate. 
 
 
4. Credibility and speculative pressures 
 
In this section we study the degree of credibility for the implicit band regimes 
suggested by the analysis developed in the previous section and we check the degree of 
exchange market pressure for the Yen/Dollar exchange rate.  
 
Regarding the credibility for the period going from 30 April to 31 December 
1980, the implicit central parity is estimated by a least squares regression in which only 
a trend and a constant are included. The estimated central parity is shown in Figure 3. It 
should be noted in passing that this central parity coincides with the equilibrium 
Yen/Dollar rate for the year 1980 as suggested in Ito (1992, Figure 10.2). A band of 
±6% is considered to include all observations falling within it during the 
aforementioned period14. From the analysis carried out in the previous section and from 
OECD reports, we assume a constant appreciation of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate 
within the implicit fluctuation bands.  
 
As for the period going from 23 February to 18 October 1987, following 
Funabashi (1989) and Esaka (2000) we assume a target zone with a central rate of 
153.50 Yen/Dollar and a band of ±5%, being the central rate, which was rebased on 7 
April 1987 up to 146 Yen/Dollar to reflect new market conditions. The latter central 
parity is consistent with the results reported in Bergsten and Chen (1987), suggesting an 
equilibrium Yen/Dollar rate of 140-145 during 1987. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the 
evolution of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate, adding the central parities and the band for 
the two periods studied. 
 
[Figures 5 and 6, here] 
 
Credibility is analysed using three indicators: the Svensson simple test, the drift 
adjustment method and an inverse measure of the probability of realignment. Svensson 
(1991) provided a simple test to study the credibility of a target zone exchange rate 
regime with fluctuation bands. We calculate a 100% confidence interval for the 
expected rate of realignment of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate using the three-month 
interbank rate. Taking into account the uncovered interest parity hypothesis, the 
expected rate of realignment is bounded according to:  
 
  (1)        / )(//)( **   tttttttttt xxiicExxii    
 
where xt is the deviation of the log exchange rate st from the log central parity ct, tx  and 
tx  are the lower and upper bounds of the exchange rate bands,  is the maturity (valued 
                                                 
14 This band has been chosen as an exploratory proposal and hence the results must be interpreted in 
relative terms, i.e. as a comparison of the different subperiods during the period studied, in this case 1980.  
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at 3/12 for a 3-month maturity), i-i* is the interest rate differential and E[∙] is the 
expectation operator. 
 
The results of this test for 1980 and 1987 are shown in Figures 7 and 8 
respectively. As can be seen in both cases, the hypothesis of a realignment expectation 
equals to zero cannot be rejected. Nonetheless, in 1980 the expected rate of revaluation 
grows during the early part of the period, reaching its highest values around June. This 
behaviour was probably related to trader caution due to the upcoming parliamentary 
elections on 22 June, particularly in view of the sudden death of Prime Minister Ohira 
which added further uncertainty to the election campaign. The lowest values of the 
expectation of revaluation occur in August, most likely due to the outbreak of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq [see, e. g., (Pardee, 1980, 1981) and (OECD, 1980, 1981)]. 
Furthermore, in the case of 1987 this measure could reflect both the existence of 
revaluation expectations at the end of March, just before the supposed change in central 
parity from 153.5 to 146 Yen/Dollar, and of the expectations of devaluation of the Yen 
at the end of July. 
 
[Figures 7 and 8, here] 
 
The second indicator to gauge the degree of credibility is the drift adjustment 
method. This method, originally proposed by Bertola and Svensson (1993), computes 
an econometric estimate of the expectations of economic agents regarding the 
realignment. These realignment expectations constitute an inverse measure of 
credibility. The procedure involves estimating the expected rate of variation of the 
exchange rate within the band in the absence of realignment, and then computing the 
expected rate of realignment gt. Once gt has been estimated, the corresponding 90% 
confidence intervals can be calculated. 
  
In this paper we have estimated the expected rate of depreciation within the 
bands using a linear regression model where the exchange rate and the domestic and 
foreign interest rates are taken as explanatory variables:  
 
(2)                  3
*
21 
 


 

 tttt
j
jj
tt iixd
xx
   
 
where xt+ and xt are the exchange rate (log) deviation from the central parity at times 
t+ and t, respectively. In the case of the 1987 bands, the variables dj denote the 
dummies for the subperiods defined by the realignment on 7 April suggested by Esaka 
(2000). 
 
Figures 9 and 10 show the expected rate of realignment and the 90% confidence 
intervals for the studied periods of 1980 and 1987, respectively. As for the year 1980, 
expectations of revaluation are confirmed as increasing in May and June, as well as in 
December, following the announcement early that month by the Ministry of Finance 
that it would increase the quotas available to Japanese and foreign banks for swapping 
Dollar borrowing into Yen. This announcement gave more scope for capital inflows and 
improved market sentiment for the Yen. The expected rates of realignment greater than 
zero are obtained in August. With respect to 1987, the method enables us to reject the 
hypothesis of null expectations of a realignment during the more critical stages of the 
period studied. Thus, it clearly reflects both the expectations of revaluation in March, 
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May-June and August-September, and the expectations of devaluation in July and 
October. These results are very similar to those obtained by Esaka (2000, p. 123). 
 
[Figures 9 and 10, here] 
  
Lastly, the probability of non-realignment is obtained using Logit estimation. 
Here we have introduced the exchange rate, the distance to central parity and the 
interest rate differential as the explanatory variables. The selection of these variables 
stems from our interest in estimating credibility with high frequency data. 
 
Assuming there is no credibility when yt=0 and that when yt=1 there is 
credibility, we use the drift-adjustment method to design the Logit model. As explained 
above, the method estimates the 90% confidence interval. If both limits of the interval 
were simultaneously greater than, or less than, zero, the agents would have expected 
realignments with 90% confidence and yt =0, otherwise yt =1. 
 
The probabilities estimated from the exchange rate, distance to central parity and 
the interest rate differential (not shown here to save space, but available from the 
authors upon request) suggest that, when the exchange rate is used as the explanatory 
variable in estimating the probability of non-realignment, May 1980 could be classified 
as a low-credibility month. When distance to central parity is used, credibility is 
reduced in August and at the beginning of December 1980. Finally, there is evidence of 
an increase in credibility from August until December, with some marginal credibility 
losses in October and December. 
 
Regarding the 1987 period, when the exchange rate is used, the probability of 
non-realignment would have been lower at the end of February and in March 1987, as 
well as at the end of July and the early days of August of that year. Alternatively, when 
using the distance of the exchange rate to the central parity, the results suggest that the 
probability of realignment is higher during May and in the latter part of July. Finally, 
the use of the interest rate differential confirms the lowest credibility in March, as well 
as suggesting marginal credibility losses in July. 
 
In recent years a number of researchers have claimed success in predicting 
currency crises. To that end, a definition of crisis has been necessary. Therefore, as a 
complementary analysis of the credibility measures, we calculate two exchange market 
pressure indices in order to know how robust the bands were. Both indices are weighted 
average of monthly percentage depreciations and monthly percentage reductions in 
reserves15. Both indices increase just before the beginning of the subperiod of 1980 
(Figures 11 to 14). In fact, they exceed the critical level in one case, and decrease all 
during 1980.  This suggests that the implicit band could have mitigated the speculative 
behaviour in the exchange market. The implications for the 1987 subperiod are less 
clear. 
 
[Figures 11 and 14, here] 
                                                 
15 The weights used by Edison (2003) incorporate the standard deviations of the exchange rate and the 
reserves, while Kaminsky et al (1998) introduce the standard deviations of the variations of the exchange 
rate and the reserves. Furthermore, in the first paper the critical level to consider a currency crisis is the 
mean plus 1.5 times the standard deviation of the index, while in the second one is the mean plus 3 times 
the standard deviation of the index. 
 15 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have attempted to identify implicit exchange rate regimes for 
the Yen/Dollar. This particular rate was chosen because it is generally viewed as being 
the most flexible of all the exchange rates in the world economy. Confirmation of the 
existence of such regimes has major empirical implications given the widespread 
comparative use made of the rate. 
 
To that end, we have applied different statistical approaches to data covering the 
period 1971-2003. Our results indicate that implicit regimes, excluding flexible ones, 
would have seemed to exist. An approach based on the use of exchange rate data to find 
de facto bands suggests that such regimes are present, but the results obtained are not 
informative. A more realistic method considers central bank interventions in the foreign 
exchange markets in order to study the intention (and efficacy) in maintaining the 
exchange rate within certain limits. 
 
 A directional prediction test has been applied, as standard time-series 
techniques may not be well suited to the study of the relationship between exchange 
rates and foreign exchange interventions. This test considerably restricts the implicit 
band regimes for the Yen/Dollar exchange rate. In the case of the Fed, the intention and 
efficacy of interventions are suggested for two subperiods: April-December 1980 and 
March-October 1987, the latter coinciding with the Louvre Accord. 
 
 To the extent that the market learns about the intentions behind central bank 
stabilizing interventions, an announcing hypothesis can also be considered. A study of 
the credibility of implicit bands was therefore undertaken for both subperiods 
mentioned above. Several critical events for the Yen/Dollar exchange were detected.  
For the episode of implicit bands detected for the year 1980, all the indicators reflect a 
lack of credibility in June, August and December. For the period identified around the 
Louvre Accord in 1987, there is evidence of credibility losses in May and June. For the 
remaining subperiods, the credibility indicators suggest a high degree of confidence by 
agents regarding the exchange rate’s evolution within the implicit bands. This, in turn, 
could be considered to be further evidence supporting the existence of implicit 
fluctuation bands that compromised the behaviour of the Fed and the Bank of Japan in 
the exchange rate markets. 
 
This paper has demonstrated the potential usefulness of a sequential procedure to 
detect implicit bands, taking into account both the dynamics of the exchange rate and 
the interventions of central banks. In our opinion, the results obtained suggest that 
further consideration of this procedure for other exchange rates could prove to be a 
fruitful exercise. 
 
 From the empirical point of view, central banks should be more transparent 
when communicating their interventions in foreign exchange markets, even providing 
researchers with the actual data involved in these operations. Where this is not possible, 
extensive literature exists to suggest alternative, more realistic measures of 
interventions other than changes in foreign reserves [see, e. g., Quirk (1977), Dornbusch 
(1980), Gärner (1987) and Hodgman and Resek (1987)]. 
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Figure 1 
 
Test of the average monthly variations. Bands of ±1%  
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Figure 2 
 
Test of the average monthly variations. Bands of ±2% 
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Figure 3 
 
Test of the average monthly deviations from relative PPP. Bands of ±1%  
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Figure 4 
 
Test of the average monthly deviations from relative PPP. Bands of ±2%  
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Figure 5 
 
Yen/Dollar exchange rate, implicit central parity and bands 
(30 April 1980 to 31 December 1980) 
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Figure 6 
 
Yen/Dollar exchange rate, implicit central parity and bands 
(23 February 1987 to 18 October 1987) 
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Figure 7 
 
Svensson’ test. 100% confidence interval 
(30 April 1980 to 31 December 1980) 
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Figure 8 
 
Svensson’ test. 100% confidence interval 
(23 February 1987 to 18 October 1987) 
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Figure 9 
 
Drift adjustment method. 90% confidence interval 
(30 April 1980 to 31 December 1980) 
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Figure 10 
 
Drift adjustment method. 90% confidence interval 
(23 February 1987 to 18 October 1987) 
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Figure 11 
 
Japan. Exchange Market Pressure Index  
Based on Edison (2003) 
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Figure 12 
 
Japan. Exchange Market Pressure Index  
Based on Kaminsky et al (1998) 
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Figure 13 
 
US Exchange Market Pressure Index  
Based on Edison (2003) 
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Figure 14 
US Exchange Market Pressure Index  
Based on Kaminsky et al (1998) 
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Table 1. Description of variables incorporated to the Pesaran-Timmermann test for the analysis of intention and efficacy 
Variables Intention  Efficacy  
 Formulation Description Formulation Description 
hy  khhh ssy  loglog  % depreciation of yen )log(log hkhh ssy    % appreciation of yen 
0hy   0hh yI  1 if depreciation of yen, 0 otherwise  0hh yI  1 if appreciation of yen, 0 otherwise 
hyˆ  -intervenjap Sales of $ -intervenjap Sales of $ 
0ˆ hy   0ˆ hh yI  1 if  sale of $, 0 otherwise  0ˆ hh yI  1 if  sale of $, 0 otherwise 
0ˆ  hh yy
 
 0ˆ  hhh yyI  1 if  purchase of  $ after appreciation of yen or sale of  $ after depreciation 
of yen; 0 otherwise 
 0ˆ  hhh yyI  1 if  depreciation of yen after purchase of  $ or 
appreciation of yen after 
sale of  $; 0 otherwise 
1p   

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0  
Probability of  yen depreciation 
 

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0  
Probability of  yen 
appreciation 
1pˆ   

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0ˆˆ  
Probability of  sale of $ intervention 
 

 
H
h
hh yIHp
1
1
1 0ˆˆ  
Probability of  sale of $ 
intervention 
SR  
 

 
H
h
hhh yyIHSR
1
1 0ˆ.  
Probability of  success under 
dependence  

 
H
h
hhh yyIHSR
1
1 0ˆ.  
Probability of  success 
under dependence 
SRI    1111 ˆ11ˆ ppppSRI 
 
Probability of success under 
independence 
  1111 ˆ11ˆ ppppSRI   Probability of success 
under independence 
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Table 2  
Pesaran-Timmermann Test 
Months k-values (days) 
1 5 10 20 30 40 60 
Panel A: ex-post 
1980-Jan 1.35 0.89 -0.78 1.41 0.45   
1980-Mar     2.00 2.00 2.00 
1980-Apr 3.03 2.27 1.73 1.13 1.48 1.48 1.48 
1980-May 1.59       
1980-Jul 1.11 0.50 -0.13 1.01 1.75 2.52 2.52 
1980-Aug 0.88 0.76 0.76 1.78 4.01 4.01 4.01 
1980-Nov 2.44 1.89 3.62 -0.33 1.89 1.09 1.01 
1980-Dec -0.80    0.60 2.11 2.11 
1981-Jan 1.20 2.25 -1.52 0.95    
1982-Oct 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
1987-Mar 1.98 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 3.02 
1987-Aug 2.14 2.86 2.14 2.86 2.86 2.86 2.86 
1988-Sep 0.71 0.71  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
1989-Apr 0.71 0.71  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
1989-May 1.50       
1989-Jun     2.00 2.00 2.00 
1989-Jul 1.00      1.00 
1990-Mar  1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 
Panel B: ex-ante 
1980-Jan 0.78 -1.81 0.45     
1980-Mar      2.00 2.00 
1980-Apr -0.43 -1.54      
1980-May -1.26 1.59    -0.60  
1980-Jul -1.26 1.75 1.75 2.52 1.75 -0.19  
1980-Aug 1.14 -0.54 -0.29     
1980-Nov -0.63 0.92 1.09 -0.33    
1980-Dec 0.60 -0.40     -0.40 
1981-Jan -1.20 0.92 1.34 0.51    
1982-Oct  0.71 0.71  0.71 0.71 0.71 
1987-Mar 0.66      0.43 
1987-Aug 0.48 -0.65 2.09 2.86 2.86 2.09  
1988-Sep 0.71 0.71  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
1989-May 0.85 0.47 0.37 0.47 0.75 0.66 0.47 
1989-Jun     2.00   
Note: the results for periods with Student-t close to 0.00 are omitted. 
 
